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SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE – FROM A “DEFERENT” TO A “NOVICE” JUDGE:
In this very interesting paper, the author deals with the relation between law and science or,
more specifically, about the role of scientific evidence in courts. He discusses the problem of
that relation by primarily considering two issues. First, he looks at the general attitude of judges
towards such evidence and, secondly, the argumentative strategies followed by parties to a
dispute when they are confronted with expert testimony based on scientific evidence and which
favors the opposing party.
The author describes the evolution of judges’ attitudes towards scientific evidence
through two American cases, the 1923 Frye and the 1993 Daubert rulings. It transpires that, in
the first part of 20th century, judges tended to act in a subordinated, “passive” way with respect
to expert knowledge in the sense of deferring to the official (i.e., “neutral” or “universally”
valid) knowledge of the scientific community. It is perhaps no wonder that, in a world
apparently ruled by “objective” science, judges never questioned scientific theories, but were
more or less alert to ad hominem arguments if the parties attacked the reliability of the expert.
The author highlights an epistemic change after WW2, especially from the 1960s
onwards, where the objectivity of scientific theories began to be questioned. This period saw
the questioning of human rationality as such (Horkeimer, 1947), the scientific paradigm shifted
(Kuhn, 1962), and the objectivity of science turned to be based on falsification theory (Popper,
1959). The official authorities in society, including scientists and experts, were no longer taken
for granted. Ubi societas ibi ius and, accordingly, all these social changes were reflected in the
modern social role of law and courts. The law has increasingly assumed a social role that had
been once left to other social systems of value, such as religion, morality, tradition, customs,
but also science. The crises of various parallel social norms, as well as scientific norms, was
reflected in courts, which became the last resort for resolving all sorts of social disputes. This
seems to be an important reason why judges, through various procedural rules, were pushed
into the position of being more active concerning expert testimonies. Even so, judges cannot
replace requisite scientific knowledge with respect to scientific evidence.
Consequently, the Daubert judgement, which merely reflects the Zeitgeist, saw judges
being forced to become “gatekeepers” by evaluating scientific theories. This is not what judges
themselves would want, but what they necessarily do since they must come to a decision that
is not only lawful but also legitimate and by following the proper procedural steps (Luhmann,
1969). These procedural steps not only allow parties, but sometimes even judges in inquisitorial
criminal systems, to propose that certain scientific evidence be considered and which they freely
evaluate at the end.
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Regarding my comments on the paper itself, I would begin from its very last idea that the
examination and cross-examination of experts could even be improved by “allowing experts to
examine each other”, which is otherwise prohibited by the Italian and American legal systems.
As a matter of fact, the idea seems to be interesting as it would definitely improve the epistemic
value of scientific evidence, making judges’ decisions easier and better, and benefiting parties
to disputes and society in general. In fact, this is the case in Slovenia where, according to Art.
334.1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, also “[t]he injured party, legal representative, attorney
and expert may put direct questions to witnesses and experts subject to approval from the
presiding judge.” This is pursuant of the principle of material truth, according to Art. 17 of that
Act, providing that “[t]he court and state bodies participating in criminal procedure shall
establish completely and according to the truth the facts relevant for passing a lawful decision.”
If this is allowed in the criminal procedures of a more inquisitorial framework, it is not the case
in civil proceedings with a more adversarial framework.
However, I understand the procedural reservation with respect to experts examining
other experts, since the courtroom should not be an offshoot of a university or academy (i.e.
scientific community) where different theories are debated. What is typical for such is a certain
kind of procedural discipline. If such reservation does not seem to be justified from an epistemic
point of view, it seems to be from a dialectical argumentative aspect. Dialectically speaking, in
adversarial proceedings we have two parties (a protagonist and an antagonist) who confront
their positions with the goal of winning the case. For that reason, they often resort to eristic
techniques and try to find experts who would support their position. If such experts are allowed
to examine other experts, there is a risk that they would jeopardize the epistemic value of their
testimony by subordinating it to its argumentative value. In inquisitorial criminal proceedings,
the judge might choose to nominate his or her own expert who does not have an eristic
imperative on his or her shoulders. Only in this sense, and thus one that is tailored quite
narrowly, could I envisage experts examining other experts following the presiding judge’s
approval.
There could also be another point, apart from the idea that experts should participate in
cross-examination. Given the modern loss of scientific “objectivity” and the transfer of
university debates to courtrooms, the epistemic frustration of judges might be alleviated by
other manners. Judges could find some degree of consolation in various standards of proof: e.
g., if scientific evidence is not clear, or there are different views with none prevailing, in
criminal proceedings the standard of beyond reasonable doubt could be used, while in civil
proceedings the standard of the preponderance of evidence might be employed, etc. Moreover,
in the criminal context, there are a number of principles, such as presumption of innocence, in
dubio pro reo, etc., which can help the judge with the said epistemic frustration.
Finally, I have a few suggestions as to how the text’s coherence might be improved. First, the
author did not want to bother the reader with the facts and specific argumentation strategies in
the two cases discussed, Frye and Daubert. However, in order to follow the line of
argumentation closely, it would benefit from at least a short summary of what the case was
about, which scientific evidence was employed, what were the specific argumentation strategies
of the parties to the cases (with respect to ad hominem attacks and cross-examination of the
experts), and how the judges reacted and eventually decided the case. I do not want to convey
the impression that the theoretical analysis of the two approaches is not important or interesting
in itself, but it loses the requisite practical exactness without some kind of factual background.
Second, since Douglas Walton is mentioned with respect to the ad hominem argument
used to attack the experts in the old Frye framework, it might be useful to add Saunders’ views
that, although ad hominem arguments are generally fallacious, they are not such in the context
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of law. He believes that they can be used here,1 as in the Frye case, to attack the credibility of
an expert. Whilst mentioning Walton, it would also be useful to discuss his argument from
expert opinion (Walton et al., 2008, p. 310), where what is particularly interesting are his critical
questions relating to expertise, field, opinion, trustworthiness, consistency, and back evidence.
In this respect, one might be able to determine the kind of evolution that has occurred from
Frye to Daubert, and, perhaps, any additional critical questions that could be posed.
Last, but not least, the author might also like to add a rhetorical point. Whilst Goldman’s
expert/novice metaphor is said to apply to Duabert, this epistemic relationship between the
judge and the expert could be juxtaposed with the situation in Frye, where another metaphor
can be discerned. Perhaps this could be framed as the expert and the layperson? By introducing
the rhetorical figure of antitheses (Garner, 2002, p. 160), I believe that the contrast between the
two metaphors would make the first even stronger and more persuasive.
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“… considerations that are irrelevant and perhaps even misleading in areas of purely rational discourse, such a
philosophy, may be relevant and enlightening in law. With its mixture of rational debate of legal issues, inquiry
into factual issues, and concern with demands of justice, law may tolerate a wider variety of arguments.” (Saunders,
1993, p. 345).
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